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Who’s to blame or praise? Performance attribution challenges in 





Purpose: The aim of this paper is to understand the antecedents and effects of performance 
attribution challenges arising in the provision of business-to-business (B2B) services in 
supply chains. 
 
Design/methodology/approach: The study draws on three in-depth case studies of logistics 
service providers (LSPs) offering supply chain solutions to their clients in Sweden. The 
analysis of performance attribution challenges and their antecedents and effects is based on 
38 semi-structured interviews and review of 43 documents, including contracts and 
performance monitoring records.  
 
Findings: Three key antecedents of performance attribution challenges are stressed. Two of 
these, the inseparability and contestability of service inputs, are closely related to the notion 
of service co-production. The third antecedent is the limited provider capability in 
performance data collection and analysis. Performance attribution challenges may result in 
provider aversion to performance-related risk and have a harmful effect on client 
relationships e.g. in terms of provider perceptions of opportunism and unfair allocation of 
gains. These effects can be mitigated through contracting, interventions in performance 
measurement system design and deployment of relational mechanisms. 
 
Research limitations/implications: The paper extends the service management literature 
emphasising service co-production by suggesting that inputs of the client firm and its supply 
chain partners may not only vary in quality but can also be inseparable from provider inputs, 
and highly contestable. It also empirically demonstrates how performance attribution 
challenges and their antecedents and effects manifest themselves in B2B service provision, as 
opposed to supply chain settings where the main user of logistics services is the consumer.    
 
Practical implications: LSP managers should contract for performance based on high-
quality and incontestable external inputs they rely upon. Contractual specifications 
(performance indicators and related incentives) should explicate and consider the inputs 
required by clients and their supply chain partners in order to minimise their contestability.  
 
Originality/value: The study proposes an empirically-based framework of the antecedents 
and effects of performance attribution challenges, an issue that has received scant attention in 
logistics outsourcing research and the business services literature more broadly.   
 









1. Introduction  
The aim of this paper is to empirically understand the antecedents and effects of performance 
attribution-related challenges arising in the provision of business-to-business (B2B) services 
in supply chains. Attribution of service performance is defined in this study as the search for 
causes of service delivery failures and/ or achievements with particular emphasis on the locus 
of such causes i.e. what or who to blame /praise (Oflac et al., 2012; Hess et al., 2003). 
Performance attribution in supply chain contexts presents challenges in that the existence of 
multiple actors creates complexity in determining what or who is to be held responsible for 
product or service failures (Oflac et al., 2012).  
The study examines performance attribution in the context of logistics services. Locating 
causes of service delivery failures /achievements is rather complicated in advanced logistics 
service provision whereby logistics service providers (LSPs) act as ‘supply chain integrators’ 
(Liu and Wang, 2015) and coordinate the inputs of multiple actors e.g. service sub-
contractors, the client and its supply chain partners (Selviaridis and Norrman, 2014). 
Attribution of service delivery failures /achievements in these settings refers to multiple 
facets and dimensions of performance (e.g. information management, supply chain design 
and planning, cost management, and physical distribution activities) which are managed as a 
whole by the LSP integrator (Shi et al., 2016; Krakovics et al. 2008). The operational 
complexity arising from multi-actor contribution to multi-dimensional service delivery 
performance makes it challenging to clearly attribute performance to LSP effort and inputs, 
as opposed to the inputs of the client and other parties contributing to service delivery 
(Hartmann and de Grahl, 2012). 
Performance attribution-related challenges and their antecedents and effects are examined 
in this study from a service provider vantage point. This is because a limited ability to clearly 
attribute service delivery performance to LSP inputs may have significant implications for 
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LSP firms in terms of client satisfaction as well as incentive alignment with clients through 
risk and gain sharing. A limited ability to attribute service delivery failures /achievements 
(against the agreed performance levels) to provider inputs can result in client dissatisfaction 
with the LSP even in cases where the actual cause of a service failure lies with other parties, 
or the client firm itself. On the other hand, a positive contribution of the LSP to the client’s 
supply chain performance may go unnoticed by the client firm if it cannot be clearly 
attributed to LSP inputs and effort, and may even result in the client firm attributing positive 
performance outcomes to itself (rather than to the LSP). Overcoming performance 
attribution-related challenges can help increase transparency in relation to the inputs required 
by the client, its supply chain partners and service sub-contractors for successful LSP service 
delivery and, in this sense, facilitate also collaborative service delivery and performance 
improvement (Yang and Zhao, 2016). 
Beyond improved client satisfaction and collaboration, clear attribution of service delivery 
performance can help align LSPs’ goals and incentives with those of their clients. 
Specifically, it can make LSPs more willing to share performance-related risks with their 
clients, insofar as service delivery failures would be clearly attributable to inputs and actions 
of the provider and other collaborating parties. Similarly, performance attribution can enable 
the sharing of performance-related gains for the client (e.g. increasing client sales attributed 
to LSP improvement in stock availability) so as to incentivise LSP continuous performance 
improvement and innovation (Sanchez Rodriguez et al., 2015; Wagner and Sutter, 2012).  
Indeed, improved performance attribution can facilitate the deployment of value-based 
payment schemes (comprising revenue and risk sharing mechanisms), which is a strategic 
intent of large LSPs in order to combat the cost-based, competitive margins prevailing in this 
industry and position themselves towards the ‘high-value’ end of the market (Prockl et al., 
2012; Lukassen and Wallenburg, 2010).  
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Despite the above implications of performance attribution for providers, we have a limited 
understanding of this issue in logistics service provision, as well as in B2B service settings 
more broadly. In particular, the extant service management and logistics outsourcing 
literatures offer scant empirical insights into the nature of performance attribution challenges 
in B2B contexts, what triggers those and what theirs effects are. This paper empirically 
addresses these issues from a service provider perspective by posing two research questions: 
RQ1: What are the antecedents of performance attribution challenges in relation to 
outsourced service provision in supply chains? 
RQ2: What are the effects of performance attribution challenges in relation to outsourced 
service provision in supply chains, and how are they managed?   
To pursue the research questions the study draws on three in-depth case studies of LSPs 
providing advanced logistics services to their clients in Sweden. The analysis of performance 
attribution challenges and their antecedents and effects is based on 38 semi-structured 
interviews and review of 43 documents, notably contracts and performance records. 
The paper contributes to service management literature, which has stressed the effect of 
variability in client inputs on service delivery quality, by suggesting that service inputs may 
also be inseparable and contestable and impede the attribution of service delivery 
performance to LSP effort, as opposed to that of the client or third parties in the supply chain. 
It also contributes to existing literature by empirically demonstrating how performance 
attribution challenges manifest themselves in B2B service settings, what their antecedents 
and effects are, and how such effects can be managed. The findings suggest implications for 
LSP managers involved in contracting and performance management, e.g. by accounting for 
contestable inputs required by clients to positively influence service delivery.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the relevant 
literature, and Section 3 discusses the research methodology. Section 4 provides the within-
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case descriptions and analyses, whereas Section 5 presents the cross-case analysis and 
discusses the findings. Section 6 concludes and draws out research and managerial 
implications as well as future research opportunities.  
 
2. Literature review 
This section outlines the implications of advanced logistics service provision for performance 
management, specifically for the design and management of logistics service performance 
measurement systems and contracts. It then discusses performance attribution in relation to 
business services provision and presents a preliminary analytical frame of the antecedents and 
effects of performance attribution-related challenges facing service providers.   
       
2.1.Logistics outsourcing  
The logistics outsourcing literature collectively suggests that LSPs have assumed a strategic 
role in the supply chains of their clients (Yang and Zhao, 2016) as the latter increasingly 
draw on external expertise and capabilities to improve their supply chain performance in 
terms of service levels, cost efficiency and environmental sustainability (Rossiter Hofer et al., 
2015; Rossi et al., 2013; Gotzamani et al., 2010). This phenomenon is termed ‘third party 
logistics’ (3PL) and refers to the organisational practice of contracting out logistical activities 
(e.g. transportation and warehousing), which had previously been performed in-house, to 
specialist providers (Hwang et al., 2016; Selviaridis and Spring, 2007). Responding partly to 
client requirements for value-added services, and partly to pressures to extend margins 
through differentiation, many LSPs have moved from transport- and warehouse-oriented 
offerings to the provision of integrated supply chain solutions to their clients (Shi et al., 2016; 
Martikainen et al., 2014). An example of advanced service provision is the ‘fourth party 
logistics’ (4PL) concept, which is defined in the literature as a non-asset based business 
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model (Van Hoek and Chong, 2001) whereby LSPs bear responsibilities of designing and 
planning supply chains and managing global logistics flows on behalf of their clients  
(Evangelista et al., 2012; Hingley et al., 2011). In advanced service provision LSPs rely on 
collaborating providers for physical distribution capabilities and assets (e.g. transportation 
modes and warehouses). The LSP essentially assumes the role of a logistics integrator 
bringing together complementary service systems, resources and capabilities and managing 
them as a whole to improve the client’s supply chain performance (Liu and Wang, 2015).  
It has also been suggested that the provision of advanced services entails increasing 
complexity in measuring and managing outsourcing performance since: (a) performance has 
multiple dimensions (Krakovics et al., 2008), and (b) service provision requires coordinating 
multiple parties, in addition to the LSP, that all contribute to service delivery (Liu and Wang, 
2015; Büyüközkan et al., 2009). In order for LSPs to demonstrate their contribution to 
performance improvement and innovation and potentially share related gains with the client 
(Grawe et al., 2015; Wagner and Sutter, 2012), there need to exist mechanisms for reviewing 
performance outcomes and attributing causes of service failures or achievements to LSP 
inputs, as opposed to those of the client or collaborating parties. Hence, the literature draws 
attention to the design and implementation of performance metrics and payment schemes 
included in contracts (e.g. Sanchez Rodriguez et al., 2015; Lukassen and Wallenburg, 2010).  
 
2.2.Measuring and managing logistics service performance 
The role of performance measurement and management systems in successful outsourcing 
relationships is stressed in the literature, as they allow controlling the provider’s performance, 
identifying areas of service improvement, and eventually increasing business and financial 
performance of the client firm (e.g. Gunasekaran et al., 2015; Jayaram and Tan, 2010; Van 
Hoek, 2001). Existing studies of logistics service performance measurement and management 
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appear to focus on the definition and design of suitable key performance indicators (KPIs) 
and the development of effective measurement methodologies (Huo et al., 2015; Rajesh et 
al., 2012; Krakovics et al., 2008). A large suite of performance metrics have been proposed 
including delivery timeliness, order fill rates, picking accuracy,  inventory turns and cost 
savings (Sanchez Rodriguez et al., 2015; Hsiao et al., 2010; Hamdan and Rogers, 2008). The 
literature also points at potential performance trade-offs that have to be made e.g. higher 
levels of delivery reliability can compromise potential cost reductions resulting from 
consolidation (Leung et al., 2013). While some studies tend to focus exclusively on internal 
performance measures for LSPs (e.g. Kayakutlu and Buyukozkan, 2011; Min and Joo, 2006; 
Lai et al., 2004), the majority often encapsulates also customer-facing measures and targets 
e.g. service levels improvement, cost reduction and flexible pricing (see Rajesh et al., 2012; 
Büyüközkan et al., 2009).  
The literature also stresses the increasing complexity of performance measurement and 
management in advanced logistics service provision in that deployed metrics and 
performance monitoring systems are not only oriented towards the LSP, but also reflect the 
performance obligations of contracted transport and warehousing companies and any third 
parties contributing to service delivery  (see Krakovics et al., 2008). However, there is little 
evidence as to whether the obligations of clients (in terms of the inputs they must contribute) 
are also reflected in the agreed performance metrics and monitoring systems.  
In addition to performance measurement systems, the role of formal contracts in 
monitoring LSP performance and incentivising its improvement has been stressed (Huo et al., 
2015; Marasco, 2008). More specifically, the literature emphasises the role of contracting in 
allocating performance-related risks and gains and agreeing payment schemes that help to 
align the goals of LSPs and their clients (Yang et al., 2016; Wu et al., 2015; Wagner and 
Sutter, 2012).  A particular contract type emphasising explicit incentives for performance 
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improvement is the performance-based contract (PBC). This ties the provider’s payment to 
the achievement of well-specified performance targets, hence transferring performance-
related risk to the LSP (Jin et al., 2015; Logan, 2000). In practice it often entails the design of 
an incentive fee (financial penalty/ bonus) as a percentage of the total service fee (usually 
fixed or unit price) that is paid out to the service provider (Doerr et al., 2005).  
Clearly defined performance metrics and targets and performance measurement 
capabilities are necessary conditions for successful use of PBCs (Forslund, 2012). Existing 
research, however, has identified several barriers of leveraging PBCs to manage and improve 
service performance, such as customer reluctance to offer extra rewards in exchange for LSP 
risk taking, excessive investments required in performance monitoring systems, and lack of 
LSP capabilities to measure and analyse performance (Selviaridis and Norrman, 2015; 
Whipple and Roh, 2010; Logan, 2000). Challenges facing LSPs in relation to performance 
measurement also include the limited ability to attribute service failures /achievements to the 
LSP, as opposed to the client and other parties co-producing service delivery (Hartmann and 
de Grahl, 2012). Despite its importance for LSPs, the latter challenge has hitherto been 
underplayed in the existing literature. Specifically, there is scant empirical evidence of what 
causes performance attribution-related challenges, what their effects are, and how such 
effects can be managed.  This issue is addressed in the following section. 
  
2.3.Performance attribution challenges 
Performance attribution concerns the search for causes of service delivery failures or 
achievements and specifically for the locus of such causes i.e. what or who to blame /praise 
(Hess et al., 2003). Generally speaking, performance failures tend to instigate more 
attributional searches than achievements because individuals or organisations perceive 
negative events as more impactful (Folkes, 1984). Locating causes of performance failures or 
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achievements in supply chains is complicated owning to the fact that multiple parties 
contribute to product /service delivery (Oflac et al., 2012), as well as due to the generic 
tendency of individuals or organisations to attribute positive outcomes to self, and negative to 
others (Folkes, 1984). Performance attribution issues in logistics service delivery has 
attracted limited attention (see Oflact et al., 2012; Hess et al., 2003) with existing studies 
focusing on business-to-consumer (B2C) settings and underplaying the antecedents and 
effects of related challenges in B2B service contexts. The rest of this section draws on service 
management literature and agency theory to present a preliminary analytical frame of 
performance attribution challenges facing service providers, and their antecedents and effects.  
The existing service management literature implicitly associates performance attribution 
challenges with co-production, which is seen as an inherent feature of service exchanges 
(Sampson, 2000). Two different literature streams emphasise service co-production. The 
unified services theory posits that customers of a service simultaneously act as suppliers of 
inputs (e.g. information and their material possessions) into service production and delivery 
(Sampson and Froehle, 2006). In this sense, supply chains of services involve bi-directional 
input flows (Sampson, 2000). In the context of advanced logistics services this means that the 
client firm and perhaps other users of the logistics services (e.g. the client’s customers) are 
required to contribute their inputs (e.g. information or other resources) into service delivery, 
which is designed and executed by the LSP in coordination with contracted transport and 
warehousing operators.   
Customers of services may assume multiple roles in service delivery, e.g. provide labour 
and essential service process components, or design service production processes (Sampson 
and Spring, 2012). The implication of this duality of the customer as a ‘supplier of inputs’ is 
that service delivery performance is directly influenced by the quality of inputs provided by 
the customer. A key challenge for service providers then is to manage the variability of 
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customer inputs into the service delivery process (Sampson and Froehle, 2006).  Relating 
again to logistics services, this means that the LSP must ensure, for instance, that the client 
offers timely and accurate information regarding sales forecasts and product volumes.  And 
that, in the example of returnable packaging services, the client’s suppliers return empty 
packages in a timely fashion to ensure package availability for delivery of parts to the client’s 
production facility (see Selviaridis et al., 2016).    
The second literature stream that stresses co-production and value co-creation through 
close interactions and coordination of activities between service providers and their 
customers is the so-called service dominant logic (SDL) (e.g. Randall et al., 2010; Vargo and 
Lusch, 2004). SDL suggests too that the customer provides inputs into service delivery and 
tends to focus on relational mechanisms to manage co-production, specifically referring to 
collaboration and information and knowledge sharing (Randall et al., 2011; Ng et al., 2009) 
to ensure successful service delivery. It underplays, however, relevant contractual responses 
to the risks of service co-production. A key concern in co-production is opportunistic 
behaviour (Wallenburg and Schӓffler, 2014) and specifically the condition of ‘shirking’, 
whereby one or more parties involved in team work may intentionally reduce their effort and 
free-ride on the output of co-production. Since the outcome of co-production is often more 
than just the sum of individual inputs and contributions, as synergistic effects are at play, it 
may be difficult to detect which party is ‘shirking’ (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972).  
Contract theory has long focused on opportunism effects associated with joint production 
(Foss and Stea, 2014; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In particular, principal-agent theory seeks 
to address such moral hazard problems by designing contracts that minimise agency costs 
related to performance monitoring and risk bearing (Halldórson et al., 2015; Feldman and 
Montgomery, 2015). The choice between behaviour- and outcome-based contracts is 
determined by factors pertaining to the service exchange characteristics and the attributes of 
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actors involved in service delivery (Wynstra et al., 2015; Fayezi et al., 2012). Outcome 
uncertainty, outcome measurability, and risk aversion of agents and principals are especially 
pertinent to the managerial challenge of monitoring and attributing performance (Eisenhardt, 
1989). Performance can be less readily measured and attributed in situations of joint (service) 
production (Zhang et al., 2015). In addition, variability in performance can result from 
uncertain environmental factors that cannot fully be anticipated (Eisenhardt, 1989). Low 
outcome measurability and high outcome uncertainty introduce performance-related risk for 
principals (clients) and agents (providers) and may discourage them from designing an 
outcome-based contract, depending also on their degree of aversion to performance risk (Liu 
and Wang, 2015; Whipple and Roh, 2010). Provider risk aversion makes an outcome-based 
contract less attractive since transferring risk to the LSP becomes expensive (i.e. requires risk 
premium payments), whereas client risk aversion makes it more attractive (Logan, 2000). 
When outcome-based contracts are preferred, their design may also reflect an appropriate risk 
allocation through the payment mechanism so that provider compensation is proportionate to 
the risk taken (Selviaridis and Norrman, 2015; Kim et al., 2007).  
In sum, service management literature and agency theory appear to complement each other 
in terms of analysing performance attribution challenges in B2B service provision. A key 
antecedent of attribution challenges facing providers (e.g. LSPs) is service co-production 
since the performance outcome is largely co-produced jointly with clients and even third 
parties contributing inputs into service delivery. The service users (i.e. client firms and their 
customers /suppliers), in particular, serve as suppliers of inputs and, therefore, directly 
influence (logistics) service performance. In addition, outcome (performance) measurability 
and uncertainty may influence the ability to attribute service delivery performance to specific 
actors. In terms of their effects, performance attribution challenges may discourage LSPs 
from signing up to performance-based incentive systems. They may also have negative 
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effects for LSPs in terms of managing client relationships when the limited ability to attribute 
performance incentivises ‘shirking’ behaviour. The literature suggests that such effects can be 
managed through relational and /or contractual mechanisms. This preliminary analytical 
frame is employed to the empirical study presented in the following sections.  
 
3. Research methodology 
The study adopted a multiple case embedded design (Yin, 2003) following rigorous 
procedures for case selection, explication of the unit of analysis, theoretical framing, data 
collection using multiple sources of evidence, within- and cross-case analyses and discussion 
of findings against existing literature and theories, as recommended by Barratt et al. (2011) 
and Ketokivi and Choi (2014).  
Given the scant empirical evidence on performance attribution challenges in the context of 
logistics services (and B2B service provision more broadly), the multi-case study design was 
deemed suitable for developing an understanding and building theory through in-depth 
analysis of the specific setting and its particularities (Ketokivi and Choi, 2014; Voss et al., 
2002). The unit of analysis was the antecedents and effects of performance attribution 
challenges facing LSPs. In other words, analysis referred to the (LSP) firm level. Challenges 
facing LSPs in relation to performance attribution do have implications for how LSPs 
manage their relationships with clients and sub-contractors, but such implications were 
examined from a LSP firm vantage point. The embedded case design allowed studying 
multiple aspects of performance attribution challenges including service delivery aspects (and 
related LSP interactions with multiple supply chain parties), and contractual and performance 
management aspects (e.g. LSP interactions with clients and sub-contractors to design 
contracts and monitor performance).  
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Three in-depth case studies of LSPs operating in Sweden and providing advanced services 
to their Swedish clients were conducted. Table 1 presents the background information about 
the case companies (including the client companies), and Table 2 depicts the agreed KPIs and 
payment mechanisms per case study. The cases were purposefully selected (Patton, 1990) 
following a replication logic and including both ‘literal’ and ‘theoretical’ replication-oriented 
selection criteria (Yin, 2003). Literal replication applies when a case is selected to predict 
similar findings, whereas a theoretical replication applies when a case is selected to predict 
contrasting findings, but for predictable reasons (Yin, 2003). Regarding literal replication, 
three basic selection criteria were applied: (a) that all selected LSP firms would provide 
advanced logistics services to their clients, (b) service delivery performance would have 
multiple dimensions and be reflected by multiple KPIs, and (c) that all selected LSP firms, 
regardless of their size, would be facing performance attribution-related challenges. In terms 
of theoretical replication, the following case selection criteria were applied: (a) service scope, 
considering also the client’s industry features and logistical requirements (i.e. extent of value-
added services provided to clients), and (b) the number of actors involved in service delivery.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about Here] 
[Insert Table 2 about Here] 
 
The intention with applying the above criteria was to identify theoretically important 
similarities and differences (Flyvbjerg, 2006) across the cases regarding the antecedents and 
effects of performance attribution challenges facing LSPs, as well as how such effects are 
managed. For instance, it was expected that the multi-dimensionality of service performance 
would create difficulties in terms of LSP performance data collection and analysis across all 
cases. On the other hand, it was envisaged that differences in service scope and the number of 
14 
 
actors involved in service delivery, reflecting differences in the complexity of service 
provision, would have a bearing on extent of LSP dependence on service inputs provided by 
clients and third parties. The analysis partly confirmed such expectations, but revealed 
additional explanations for the observed differences across the cases (e.g. relative importance 
of relational and contractual mechanisms to manage effects of attribution challenges).  
In line with the study’s focus on the LSP perspective, the unit of observation was 
individual senior and middle managers of LSP firms, although access was also 
opportunistically sought to interview managers from two service sub-contractor firms (Case 
B and C) and a client firm (Case A).  Overall, data collection consisted of 38 semi-interviews, 
which enabled interviewees to express their views (Miles and Huberman, 1994) with regard 
to performance attribution challenges. The interviews addressed, amongst other themes, 
performance measurement and management issues, performance attribution challenges and 
their antecedents and effects (e.g. co-production in logistics services provision, LSP 
willingness to bear risk). Appendix A presents the interview guide. This was employed 
flexibly during the interviews considering the (functional) expertise of the interviewee (see 
details below). For example, LSP operations managers were often less knowledgeable about 
contract design aspects, and hence relevant questions were either omitted or responded to in 
brief, and at a high level of detail. On average, the interviews lasted one and a half hours.  
Two specific criteria for selecting interviewees from the LSP firms were employed: (a) 
that these managers would relate to and be knowledgeable about performance attribution 
issues, and (b) they would represent different functions within the LSP firm, as performance 
attribution issues relate to operational aspects of service delivery, contractual and 
performance management aspects, and even service design aspects.  Indeed, the LSP 
managers interviewed spanned multiple functions including Operations, Sales and Business 
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Development (BD), Key Account Management (KAM), Purchasing, and Legal. A list of 
interviewees per case study is provided in Appendix B.  
In addition to the interviews, 43 relevant organisational documents and archival records 
(notably contracts of LSPs with clients and service sub-contractors, and KPIs and payment 
schemes) were collected and analysed. Access was also granted to performance records and 
related procedures for monitoring service performance of the LSP and the contracted 
transport and warehouse operators. These documents helped to triangulate interviews with 
LSP managers and thus ensure validity (Voss et al., 2002). They also proved useful in terms 
of seeking clarifications from interviewees (Marshall and Rossman, 1999) in instances of 
contradicting evidence or disagreements (e.g. specific approaches to performance 
monitoring). In addition, documentary evidence offered some insights into the clients’ and 
sub-contractors’ perspectives (especially documents that clients and/ or sub-contractors 
jointly produced with the LSPs e.g. service level agreements). Nonetheless, it is recognised 
that such insights were rather limited, and that further research is needed to capture the 
perspectives of these actors in relation to performance attribution challenges and their 
antecedents and effects (see Section 6.3).  
The data coding and analysis procedure followed recommendations by Miles and 
Huberman (1994) and Yin (2003). Data were initially classified according to their source 
(interviews and documents), and were analysed to identify key themes (e.g. performance 
attribution challenges). Secondly, all data were re-grouped per case study to facilitate within-
case understanding, and analysis of the key concepts and their interrelations (Barratt et al., 
2011). Thirdly, codes were assigned manually to interview transcripts and document sections 
following an open coding procedure (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Open codes were derived 
both from the preliminary analytical frame as well as themes emerging during the interviews 
(Voss et al., 2002). For example, empirical findings suggested that service co-production 
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relates to inseparable and contestable inputs of multiple parties contributing to logistics 
service delivery. Fourthly, these codes were re-classified into more generic categories of 
antecedents and effects of performance attribution challenges through axial coding (Strauss 
and Corbin, 1990). As an example, the super-code ‘antecedents’ included the following 
lower-level codes that were grouped together: ‘service co-production’, ‘inseparable inputs’, 
‘contestable inputs’ and ‘limited data collection/ analysis capabilities’.  
The third and fourth steps entailed both within- and cross-case analyses (Yin, 2003) 
making also use of tables (see Sections 4 and 5). A pattern matching approach was employed 
to make sense of the collected data and identify similarities and differences across the cases 
(Yin, 2003) in relation to the antecedents and effects of performance attribution challenges. 
Although the cases exhibited many similarities in terms of performance attribution 
antecedents, differences in terms of the effects and their management were also observed 
(e.g. approaches to performance measurement system design).  
The validity and reliability of findings were addressed using four criteria: internal, 
construct and external validity, and reliability (Yin, 2003). Internal validity was addressed by 
drawing on different literatures (e.g. service management literature and agency theory) to 
discuss cross-case findings, and representing the data in tabular forms (Gibbert et al., 2008). 
Construct validity was ensured by multiple actions e.g. interviewing LSP managers from 
multiple functions, and triangulating interview data with contract documents (Schwenk, 
1985). External validity was partly addressed by writing up and presenting detailed within-
case analyses to enable transferability (Voss et al., 2002), while reliability was increased by  
developing an interview guide, creating a database containing all primary data (e.g. interview 





4. Within-case description and analysis  
This section describes and analyses each case study in terms of the antecedents and effects of 
the observed performance attribution challenges facing LSPs. 
 
4.1.Case A 
This case concerns a logistics outsourcing contract with the LSP managing all equipment 
deliveries to the packaging manufacturer’s end customers, planning transport movements and 
managing a network of trucking companies, airlines and shipping lines. The LSP and the 
client firm agreed to measure and manage performance using several KPIs which are also 
partly tied to the provider’s payment (see Table 2). The LSP (and to some extent the client 
also) experienced challenges of attributing performance in terms of freight cost reduction, 
carbon emissions reduction, on-time deliveries, and innovation outcomes. Table 3 provides 
empirical evidence, in the form of quotes from the interviewed managers, regarding the 
observed attribution challenges in Case A and their antecedents and effects. A brief 
description of these is provided below. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about Here] 
 
Antecedents. The difficulty to attribute service performance is linked to service co-
production and specifically to the challenging task of clearly separating or agreeing upon the 
required inputs amongst the multiple actors involved in logistics service delivery. The CO2 
emissions reduction target is closely dependent on the decisions and actions of the client and 
its end customers (e.g. in terms of ordering patterns and production planning to minimise 
rushed deliveries) as well as on sub-contractor capacity planning. These inputs are 
challenging to separate from the LSP’s effort to reduce the use of air freight deliveries. 
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Regarding freight cost reduction targets, LSP interviewees again stressed the role of the client 
and its input in terms of providing timely and accurate order information.  
Likewise, the LSP and client firms faced challenges in terms of defining their respective 
inputs in identifying and implementing service innovations. Although client interviewees 
suggested that some of the innovative ideas claimed by the LSP had actually been identified 
by them, LSP managers contradicted this and stressed the client’s required input if service 
process innovations are to be realised (e.g. changes in product design and packaging). In 
terms of on time ocean freight deliveries, LSP managers suggested that they are heavily 
dependent on the inputs of shipping lines in terms of reliability of their schedules. In addition, 
the effect of uncontrollable inputs (such as freight market rate developments, congestion at 
ports and airports and extreme weather) on service delivery and freight cost reduction, and 
the need to discuss with the client how these should be managed, was stressed. Attribution 
challenges were also due to the limited LSP capability in performance data analysis, as both 
LSP and client interviewees suggested. Regarding innovation outcomes specifically, the LSP 
lacked a process of documenting its innovative ideas and tracking their implementation.  
Effects and their management. The above performance attribution issues made the LSP 
cautious in terms of bearing financial risks in connection to the contractual performance 
incentives. The incentive fee represented only 1 percent of the total annual service fee 
reflecting the LSP’s delimited risk and the parties worked to re-design some of the KPIs (e.g. 
CO2 emissions reduction) to ensure that their definitions and measurement methodologies 
were appropriate. The performance attribution challenges faced by LSP created some strain 
in its relationship with the client. LSP managers perceived the performance incentives as 
unfair since they felt many delivery failures were beyond their control. The imposed financial 
penalty for LSP failure to hit carbon emissions reduction and delivery accuracy targets was 
eventually not paid as the client firm recognised its contribution to service failures. This 
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decision was taken as a gesture of good faith to re-instigate fairness and collaboration, as 
explained by the interviewed client managers. LSP interviewees were also dissatisfied with 
the client’s opportunistic adoption of innovative ideas the LSP presented in informal 
meetings and without those being credited as the provider’s initiative. The LSP’s weakness in 
terms of data analysis was partly addressed by building into the performance measurement 
system ‘controllability’ and ‘accountability’ indices to capture uncontrollable factors and 
identify parties responsible for failures respectively. Three-way performance review meeting 
among the LSP, the client and transport sub-contractors were also introduced to analyse 
performance failures and rectify them. 
 
4.2.Case B 
This case concerns an outsourcing relationship where the LSP is responsible for managing 
the client’s supply chain e.g. in terms of product purchasing, inventory management, demand 
forecasting, logistics network design, and supply chain planning. The parties agreed on 
multiple KPIs with the main ones being product availability at stores and supply chain cost 
reduction, which are also tied to a bonus payment for the LSP (see Table 2).  Attribution 
challenges mainly referred to the supply chain cost reduction KPI target, as it proved difficult 
to attribute to LSP actions the potential and actual cost savings. Table 4 presents the key 
empirical findings, which are also briefly described in the following.   
 
[Insert Table 4 about Here] 
 
Antecedents. The difficulty to attribute cost reduction outcomes to LSP effort partly 
resulted from the inability to meaningfully separate the inputs of the transport and 
warehousing sub-contractors and the LSP to such outcomes. Interviewees stressed that the 
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essence of third party warehousing and transportation activity is that asset investments and 
costs are spread across multiple clients in a way that it is challenging to single out individual 
contributions to cost synergies. The lack of detailed data to be able to accurately allocate cost 
savings resulting from LSP planning and sub-contractor cost efficiencies was also stressed by 
LSP interviewees, and this added to cost savings measurement and attribution difficulty. 
Another issue was that the client’s input in terms of varying product volumes was not easily 
separable from LSP actions to increase supply chain cost efficiency. Increased (reduced) 
volumes in the supply chain could increase (reduce) scale economies regardless of LSP 
effort. Similarly, LSP effort to improve cost efficiency (e.g. reduced store delivery 
frequencies) could result in the client’s customers (stores at national level) withdrawing their 
volumes from the LSP service network, thus reducing economies of scale overall.   
 The LSP and the client, therefore, had several intensive arguments about the inputs 
required by the client and its customers (stores) to deliver cost efficiency. LSP interviewees 
stressed that cost reduction was essentially a ‘team effort’ insofar as the client had to 
convince independent stores in different countries to accept adjustments to their service levels 
and operating routines. The parties also discussed the potential effects of variable 
uncontrollable inputs (e.g. number of stores and food suppliers, packaging and labelling 
regulations) and how those should be managed. The LSP suggested a model where changes 
in these factors would trigger a renegotiation of cost performance targets and annual service 
fee. The LSP also argued extensively with key sub-contractors about their role in efficient 
service delivery. LSP interviewees suggested that sub-contractor cost efficiency was crucial 
to achieve the client’s supply chain cost reduction target, but the interviewed sub-contractor 
argued that its influence was limited due to inflexibility in transport capacity planning and 
lack of supply chain visibility and information sharing with the LSP.  
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Effects and their management. The difficulties of attributing cost savings to LSP effort 
resulted in LSP concerns about bearing excessive performance risk in connection to the fixed 
price incentive fee mechanism. This put pressure on the LSP to mitigate financial risk by 
ensuring that the fixed fee element was set at an appropriate level to cover its costs and 
provide a basic profit margin. The bonus for cost reduction appeared to be less important for 
the LSP since the cost reduction targets set by the client were perceived by LSP managers as 
too ambitious to reach. The attribution challenges also created LSP concerns about the 
management of the client relationship insofar as the parties would attempt to address such 
challenges by specifying rigid rules for identifying parties responsible for failures. The LSP 
and client initially discussed a performance measurement system whereby all supply chain 
cost increases were to be attributed to actions of individual parties. This approach, however, 
was eventually rejected by LSP managers lest that it would cultivate a ‘finger-pointing’ 
culture. Emphasis was put instead on ongoing performance analysis and improvement and 
reliance on collaboration, trust and flexibility to be able to adjust the solution and payment 
structure, if it proved not to promote a win-win outcome.  
 
4.3.Case C  
This case refers to a service contract between an auto manufacturer and a LSP responsible for 
managing transportation and returnable packaging and other related value-add services. 
Performance was defined and managed in terms of specific KPI targets which were, however, 
not directly tied to the LSP’s payment (Table 2). Challenges in terms of attributing logistics 
cost savings, and packaging availability and delivery precision results to LSP effort and 
inputs were observed in this case too. Table 5 presents the related empirical evidence. 
 
[Insert Table 5 about Here] 
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Antecedents. A first issue was the inability to accurately allocate cost savings to individual 
actions and inputs of the LSP and its transport contractors. Their inputs into service delivery 
for the specific client were difficult to separate from their services to other clients, due to 
transportation economies of scale and cost synergies created. A related challenge was one of 
measurement, as several LSP interviewees admitted that they did not have in place a sound 
data collection and analysis system to be able to measure and attribute cost savings and 
packaging availability performance to the extent that this would enable a performance-based 
payment scheme in the contract with the client.  
Performance attribution challenges also arise from the operating interdependencies 
between the activities and inputs of the LSP, the client, sub-contractors and other third 
parties. Regarding cost efficiency targets, interviewees stressed the crucial input of the client 
in terms of sharing information of forecast volumes. The LSP also stressed the client’s input 
in terms of committing to certain annual product volumes as a means of improving transport 
capacity planning and increasing efficiency across the service network. However, the client 
has been reluctant to commit to volumes with negative effects also on cost efficiency of LSP 
sub-contractors. The Managing Director of a key sub-contractor suggested that volume 
uncertainty and unpredictable spikes in transport demand compromise service capacity 
planning and cost efficiency.   
The LSP also argued extensively with the client about the inputs of the latter and its 
supply chain partners in attaining packaging availability targets. Specifically, input is 
required not only from the client but also its suppliers, who make use of packages. Their 
cooperation in terms of package ordering policy, appropriate handling and allocation of 
packages across their other customers is required to achieve availability targets. Although the 
LSP tries to influence the behavior of these package users, it cannot directly control their 
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input. Hence, the provider requests that the client should be responsible for ensuring that its 
suppliers to comply with all regulations and operating procedures of the LSP packaging pool.    
Effects and their management. The difficulties of attributing performance resulted in the 
LSP’s reluctance to bear financial risk induced by linking payment to cost savings and 
package availability targets. More specifically, the LSP did not accept for the KPIs to be tied 
to financial penalties. Bonuses did not apply either as the client was not willing to offer them 
as they would increase service prices. Interviews with LSP managers and particularly the 
Legal Counsel of the company confirmed that the experienced performance attribution 
difficulties made the provider less comfortable with bearing performance-related financial 
risk. The LSP also makes use of standard contractual terms and conditions applying in the 
transportation industry to delimit its liability for non-performance in terms of product 
damages and delays excluding also any ‘consequential losses’ (indirect damages) for the 
client. The LSP’s inability to collect detailed cost data and allocate savings to specific 
courses of action, augmented also by client’s perceived lack of transparency of service 
costing and pricing, put further strain in the relationship with the specific client, something 
that LSP interviewees admitted at the time (see Table 5).  
 
5. Cross-case analysis and discussion  
This section discusses the cross-case findings in terms of the antecedents and effects of 
performance attribution challenges facing LSPs, and the ways such effects can be managed. 
Table 6 provides a summary of the cross-case analysis. 
 
 




5.1. Antecedents of performance attribution challenges 
Three key antecedent factors appear to result in difficulties in attributing performance to the 
effort and inputs of the LSP, as opposed to the inputs of its client and its supply chain 
partners. Two of these, inseparability and contestability of inputs, are closely related to co-
production effort in service delivery processes (Martikainen et al., 2014; Sampson and 
Froehle, 2006). The distinction between inseparable and contestable service inputs is mainly 
derived from the empirical findings. It is useful to make in that although certain service 
inputs can be clearly separated, the LSP and the client may well be contesting their allocation 
and related management responsibility. Whereas in the case of inseparability the LSP cannot 
clearly determine the impact of specific service inputs due to synergistic effects and 
interdependent operating decisions (e.g. Yang and Zhao, 2016), the notion of contestability 
suggests that the LSP has the ability to explicate and argue for the inputs required by the 
client and third parties, as well as for any uncontrollable environmental inputs affecting 
logistics service performance and costs. Adding to the service management literature which is 
mainly pre-occupied with the variability of client inputs in service delivery (Ng et al., 2009), 
the findings stress how inseparable and contestable inputs influence the ability to attribute 
performance to LSP effort.  The third antecedent, limited data collection/analysis capabilities, 
also negatively influences the ability to analyse service delivery outcomes and measure and 
attribute performance to LSP inputs (see also Selviaridis and Norrman, 2015).  
 
5.1.1. Inseparable inputs  
Empirical evidence suggests that inputs of the various actors may be difficult to separate due 
to synergistic effects. In Case B, for instance, the efficiency of warehouse and transport 
operations of sub-contractors and the LSP’s planning, all of which relate to the cost reduction 
KPI, were difficult to attribute to individual actions due to scale economies arising from these 
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sub-contractors and the LSP serving multiple clients. Similarly in Case C cost efficiencies of 
LSP and service sub-contractors were impossible to pin down to specific contributions due to 
scale economy and synergy effects. In other words, attribution appears to be challenging 
when performance as a whole is greater than the sum of individual actors’ service inputs (e.g. 
Liu and Wang, 2015; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972).   
Inseparability of service inputs also results in difficulties in attributing performance to 
LSP input due to intertwined operating decisions affecting logistics service delivery 
(Hartmann and de Grahl, 2012; Eisenhardt, 1989). In case A, for example, LSP performance 
in terms of CO2 emissions reduction, which is mainly driven by the use of air freight (versus 
other transport modes), depends on a number of interdependent actions and decisions 
pertaining to the client’s customers ordering behaviour and requested speed of delivery, the 
client’s production lead time, and the sub-contractors’ capacity availability.  
 
5.1.2. Contestable inputs  
The empirical findings revealed also intense discussions and arguments among the LSPs, the 
clients and even sub-contractors about which parties (should) provide certain inputs into 
service delivery, and how (e.g. Huo et al., 2015; Logan, 2000). Case A provided evidence of 
disagreements over what inputs the client should provide in order for innovations to be 
realised (e.g. changes in product design). In Case B, achieving the supply chain cost 
reduction target requires convincing the client’s customers (stores) to accept reduced delivery 
frequencies and adjustments in the product receipt processes to enable more efficient 
unloading of goods. It also requires the sub-contractor input into cost efficiency, although the 
interviewed sub-contractor suggested that it is offered limited leeway by the LSP to plan 
transport capacity. In Case C, the LSP argued extensively with the client about the role of the 
latter in service delivery in terms of providing timely information about forecast product 
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volumes and making volume commitments. These client inputs were thought to impact LSP 
and transport sub-contractor capacity planning and cost efficiency. The necessary input of 
packaging users (e.g. the client’s suppliers) to achieve the packaging availability targets was 
also extensively discussed, e.g. in terms of timely return of empty packages.  
Contestability of inputs also refers to arguments as to who (LSP or client) should bear the 
responsibility for managing uncontrollable environmental inputs (Fayezi et al., 2012; 
Whipple and Roh, 2010). Both in Cases A and B uncertain inputs such as volatile sea and 
road freight market rates, regulatory market changes, and changes in supply chain structure 
instigated discussions about how such inputs should be managed, and by which party. 
Overall, input contestability in service co-production results in challenges to attribute 
performance to the effort of the service provider. 
 
5.1.3. Limited data collection and analysis capabilities  
The cross-case findings corroborate previous research suggesting that capabilities in 
performance data collection and in-depth analysis (e.g. Selviaridis and Norrman, 2015; 
Forslund, 2012) influence the ability to measure and attribute performance to LSP effort and 
inputs. Limited LSP capabilities to collect and analyse performance data led to significant 
challenges in terms of matching LSP inputs and effort to service innovation and cost 
reduction outcomes. In Case A, the provider lacked the resources and competences to 
conduct in-depth analysis of service delivery failures with a view to identifying their causes 
and addressing them. In Case C, LSP interviewees admitted that their information system was 
limiting their ability to collect performance data and analyse the origin of such cost savings 
within the service network. The latter was also observed in Case B and created difficulties in 




5.2.Effects of performance attribution challenges and their management  
Two key effects of challenges related to attributions of service performance to provider effort 
were observed: provider aversion to performance-related risk, and potential harm to client 
relationships of LSPs. These effects, and the ways of managing them, are discussed below.  
 
5.2.1. LSP aversion to performance risk  
Performance attribution challenges resulted in LSP aversion to performance-related risk (Liu 
and Wang, 2015; Fayezi et al., 2012) as it was challenging to either clearly separate LSP 
input from those of the client and other parties, or agree in advance and specify conditions 
under which LSPs were to be held accountable for service failures. This finding corroborates 
existing research stressing the connection between provider willingness to bear risk and the 
ability to measure and attribute performance (Selviaridis and Norrman, 2014; Kim et al., 
2007). LSP aversion to financial risk related to performance fulfilment was evident in all 
cases. In Case C, the limited ability to measure and attribute logistics cost savings resulted in 
LSP reluctance to agree to cost savings-based incentives. In Case A, the LSP contested the 
client’s role in reducing CO2 emissions reduction and this led to delimiting LSP in the 
bonus/malus scheme. In Case B, it was suggested that the intensity of the cost reduction-
based incentive fee should reflect LSP input, which resulted in the cost reduction bonus being 
perceived of secondary importance.  
 
5.2.2. Potential harm to client relationships  
Performance attribution challenges facing LSPs potentially have harmful effects on their 
client relationships (e.g. Huo et al., 2015; Whipple and Roh, 2010), as this study 
demonstrated: provider perceptions of opportunism on behalf of the client and unfair 
distribution of performance gains and risks, and client perceptions of lack of transparency of 
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service costing and pricing by the LSP. Analysis revealed that contestable service inputs and 
their influence in logistics service performance can create tensions regarding the fairness of 
the payment scheme (Case A), as perceived by providers, and create an adversarial 
atmosphere in the relationship with the client (Case C). It is also interesting to note that 
attempts to clearly specify the inputs required by each party (e.g. client) may also foster a 
relationship atmosphere where the provider and the client seek to blame each other for 
failures, as observed in Case B. Overall, challenges in relation to attributing performance to 
provider effort and inputs can have negative effects and result in deteriorating client 
relationships of LSPs. Therefore, such effects need to be managed.  
 
5.2.3. Managing the effects  
Three key means of managing effects of performance attribution challenges were observed. 
Contracting. Providers seek to mitigate their performance risk through contract design and 
more specifically through the (re)design of the payment mechanism and the agreed KPIs (Wu 
et al., 2015; Kim et al., 2007). In Case A, the LSP’s risk was delimited given that the 
designed bonus/malus scheme, as percentage of the total annual service fee, had relatively 
limited financial impact on the provider. In this case the measurement method of certain KPIs 
was adjusted too, to reflect previous difficulties in measuring and attributing performance. In 
Case B, similarly, the LSP managers emphasised the need to set the fixed fee to a level that 
would help cover its financial risk and offer also a reasonable margin. Since the client’s 
supply chain cost reduction expectations were dependent on inputs beyond the provider’s 
control, the bonus (connected to cost reduction) was perceived by LSP interviewees of 
secondary importance to the agreed payment scheme. Contracting was also mobilised in Case 
C by the LSP to mitigate its performance risks. In particular, the provider refused to tie its 
payment to KPI targets and also capped its liability for product damages and/or delayed 
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deliveries. All of the above suggest that contract design is a key mechanism through which 
providers can achieve an appropriate allocation performance risk vis-à-vis their clients 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).  
Performance measurement and management system design. The structure of the 
performance measurement system can help providers manage the potentially harmful effects 
of attribution challenges on client relationships (Gunasekaran et al., 2015). Comparison 
between Case A and B suggests, however, that two different approaches were followed. In 
Case A, the LSP in joint with the client opted for attribution-related indices (‘controllability’ 
and ‘accountability’). These were also referred to in the contract as a means of increasing 
transparency of the inputs of the LSP and other parties on performance. This suggests that 
logistics service performance measurement systems can go beyond identifying improvements 
(Forslund, 2012; Krakovics et al., 2008) and address attribution-related challenges through 
the inclusion of specific indices supporting performance measurement and analysis. In Case 
B, the LSP abstained from that logic and instead emphasised the need to analyse performance 
and identify corrective actions and act upon them on an ongoing basis. LSP interviewees felt 
that attribution-related indices would foster a ‘finger-pointing’ culture and potentially put 
strain on the client relationship.     
Relational mechanisms. In addition to employing contracting and performance 
measurement systems, providers appear to stress the deployment of relational mechanisms 
(Yang et al., 2016; Randall et al., 2010) to manage the potentially harmful effects on their 
relationships with clients. More specifically, collaboration (‘team effort’), trust, and win-win 
mentality were referred to by LSP interviewees in Case B as a means of supporting the 
ongoing performance analysis and improvement approach taken. Flexibility in adjusting the 
agreed incentive payment system was also stressed as a way to achieve win-win outcomes in 
joint with the client. In Case A, LSP interviewees and client managers referred to a 
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collaborative attitude and the need to ensure fair allocation of financial gains (cost savings). 
Overall, extra-contractual responses can be important for ameliorating problems of provider 
perceived opportunism and re-instituting fairness in the distribution of gains arising from 
LSP-driven performance improvements (Rossiter-Hofer et al., 2012). 
 
5.3. Summary and conceptual framework  
Figure 1 summarises the above findings in the form of a framework of the antecedents and 
effects of performance attribution challenges. The proposed framework extends, through the 
empirical study, the preliminary analytical frame discussed in Section 2 by stressing: (a) the 
role of inseparable and contestable inputs in service co-production. Contestable inputs may 
also include uncontrollable environmental factors increasing uncertainty in relation to service 
delivery performance, (b) the design of the performance measurement and management 
system, in addition to relational and contractual mechanisms, as a means of managing the 
potentially harmful effects of performance attribution challenges facing service providers, 
and (c) the (re)design of the payment mechanism and performance metrics as a means of 
LSPs delimiting their risk, even when performance-based contracts with clients are adopted. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
The framework suggests that the ability to attribute performance to service provider effort 
and inputs is influenced by the extent to which such service inputs are: (a) inseparable from 
inputs of other actors, due to interdependent operating decisions and synergistic effects 
arising from joint effort, and (b) contestable in terms of their provision (i.e. who should 
provide them), their uncertain effects, and the allocation of responsibility for managing such 
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effects. In addition to these two factors, the limited ability of service providers to collect and 
analyse performance data results in performance attribution challenges.  
Performance attribution challenges may in turn result in LSP aversion to performance-
related risk and can have a harmful impact on client relationships (see Figure 1), e.g. provider 
perceptions of opportunism on behalf of the client and unfair distribution of gains arising 
from LSP-driven performance improvements. Regarding the management of such effects 
(Figure 1), contracting is used to address the provider’s aversion to performance risk. In 
particular, the provider’s financial risk is mitigated through the design of the payment 
mechanism. The potential harm to client relationships is managed through performance 
management systems (including attribution-related indices or stressing interim reviews and 
in-depth performance analyses), and the deployment of relational mechanisms i.e. 
emphasising collaboration, trust, win-win mentality and distributive fairness. In addition, 
Figure 1 captures the empirical observation that contracting can also have a bearing on the 
design of performance measurement systems by adjusting KPIs and measurement methods.  
 
6. Conclusions and implications 
This paper has sought to empirically understand the antecedents and effects of performance 
attribution challenges arising in outsourced service provision in supply chains. The proposed 
framework (Figure 1) provides answers to the two research questions posed by stressing the 
inseparability and contestability of service inputs and the limited LSP capability to collect 
and analyse performance data as key antecedents (RQ1), and the provider’s aversion to 
performance risk and the potential harm to client relations as key effects. These effects can be 
managed through contracting, performance measurement systems and relational mechanisms 
(RQ2). The implications of these findings for service management and logistics outsourcing 




The proposed framework extends the service management literature emphasising service co-
production (Sampson and Spring, 2012; Randall et al., 2010) by stressing two additional 
characteristics of service inputs provided by the service provider, the client and/ or other 
supply chain parties contributing to the delivery of business services. The findings regarding 
the inseparability and contestability of service inputs extend the existing literature which 
emphasises the variability of client inputs and its importance for service delivery performance 
(Martikainen et al., 2014; Sampson and Froehle, 2006). The proposed framework suggests 
that client and third party inputs may not only vary in quality, but they can also be 
inseparable from provider inputs, and highly contestable. The empirical study demonstrates 
how the inseparability and contestability of inputs influences the ability to attribute service 
delivery failure / achievement to provider inputs (Yang and Zhao, 2016). 
The study also contributes to the scant literature on attribution of logistics service 
performance in B2C settings (Oflac et al., 2012; Hess et al., 2003) by stressing the inputs 
required by service users (i.e. the client and its customers or suppliers) in B2B contexts, and 
how such requirements are handled in the contractual relationship between the provider and 
the client. In B2C contexts the end user of services (i.e. the consumer) may attribute product 
delivery failures to the LSP, rather than the manufacturer of brand (who contracts with the 
LSP) on the basis of high brand expectations or purchase criticality. These are factors beyond 
the control of the LSP but also, crucially enough, beyond that of the manufacturer. In such 
settings the consumer does not directly impact service delivery performance, but its 
perceptions of brand quality and purchase importance are instrumental in its attribution of 
failures (Oflac et al., 2012). In B2B settings, however, the service users are organisations 
whose inputs into service delivery are identifiable, and yet may be inseparable and /or 
contestable. Unlike B2C services where the LSP does not contract with consumers, in B2B 
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settings the LSP typically has a contractual relationship with the main service user i.e. the 
client firm. The contract then becomes an instrument for mitigating performance-related risks 
by explicating inputs required by the client and its supply chain counterparts (Selviaridis and 
Norrman, 2014).  
This study helps to increase our understanding of an important, and yet underplayed, issue 
facing providers (and LSPs more specifically) by empirically demonstrating what triggers 
performance attribution challenges in B2B service settings, what their effects are, and how 
these are managed. The paper also adds to the literature focusing on logistics service 
performance measurement systems and capabilities (e.g. Gunasekaran et al., 2015; Rajesh et 
al., 2012) by suggesting that performance attribution challenges have important effects on the 
LSP in terms of risk sharing with clients (Huo et al., 2015) and client relationship 
management more broadly. These effects need to be considered when designing performance 
measurement systems and service contracts. In this respect, the case studies reveal two 
diametrically opposing approaches adopted by LSPs: (a) explicitly recognising and 
addressing performance attribution effects through the inclusion of related indices in the 
contractual specification and the associated performance measurement system (Case A), and 
(b) choosing to underplay attribution issues and not address them formally, but emphasise 
instead interim reviews and continuous improvement effort (Case B). Although existing 
studies on outsourcing performance measurement (e.g. Gunasekaran et al., 2015; Rajesh et 
al., 2012; Krakovics et al., 2008) have been useful in terms of identifying and designing 
suitable KPIs and effective measurement and monitoring methodologies, they have hardly 
addressed attribution challenges and their implications for the design and execution of 
performance management systems.  
Finally, the paper contributes to studies stressing the role of contracts in managing 
logistics service performance (e.g. Huo et al., 2015; Selviaridis and Norrman, 2015; Wagner 
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and Sutter, 2012) by empirically demonstrating how the potentially negative effects of 
performance attribution can be managed through contract (re)design. More specifically, LSPs 
put emphasis on the design of the payment mechanism and performance metrics as a means 
for mitigating their financial risks (Kim et al., 2007) and reducing their exposure to 
performance-related incentives that may be requested by customers (see Cases A and B). In 
addition, contracting can be critical in terms of delimiting the LSPs’ liabilities related to 
service delivery failures especially in situations where the ability to measure and attribute 
performance to the LSP effort is restricted.  
 
6.2.Managerial implications 
The study presents implications for LSP managers involved in contracting and the design of 
performance measurement and management systems. The findings suggest that successful 
service delivery may be heavily dependent on the inputs of clients, sub-contractors and other 
parties in supply chains. Such inputs can, however, be inseparable from LSP inputs or, more 
importantly here, highly contestable. The implication of this for LSPs is that they should 
contract for performance (improvement) based on high-quality and incontestable external 
inputs they rely upon. KPI matrices and related performance incentives should be 
accompanied by explicit and clear specifications of such inputs, especially those required by 
clients and their supply chain partners, to minimise their contestability. Contingency planning 
clauses may also be required in the contract to account for contestable inputs relating to 
market or regulatory changes, and to mitigate their potential negative impacts on service 
delivery performance.  
Nonetheless, the findings in relation to the potentially harmful effects of performance 
attribution challenges on client relationships suggest that LSPs may be better off stressing 
joint effort with clients and sub-contractors and ongoing performance review and analysis 
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with a view to proactively improving service performance, in situations where attribution 
indices might appear to foster a culture of mutual blame for service failures. Such an 
approach to performance management requires developing sound data collection and analysis 
capabilities, both in terms of information systems and human resources dedicated to 
performance management. Capability development in this area is crucial especially for LSPs 
coordinating the inputs of multiple parties contributing to service delivery.  
Finally, from a client perspective the relative ability to isolate the service provider’s effort 
and contribution to supply chain performance will determine the approach taken in 
performance monitoring and management. Outsourcing firms, as suggested above for LSPs, 
might need to address contestable inputs by explicitly detailing in the service level agreement 
conditions upon which increases in performance may not be attributable to LSP effort, but to 
other external factors, e.g. cost efficiency in the client’s supply chain can arise from an 
increase in product sales and volumes and the resulting scale economies in transportation and 
warehousing. To the extent that this is possible, outsourcing firms can then specify instances 
when logistics service performance increases should not lead to bonus payments to the 
appointed LSPs. Such an approach can help increase transparency in relation to the allocation 
of gains and risks between the LSP and the client firm, and hence reinforce the level of 
distributive fairness as this is perceived by the contracting parties.  
 
6.3.Limitations and future research   
This study has taken a service provider perspective and it thus offers limited insights into the 
perceptions of clients and service sub-contractors in relation to performance attribution 
challenges, their antecedents and effects. Future research should address these issues from the 
vantage points of these other supply chain actors. It would be particularly interesting to study 
systematically the views of sub-contractors (transport and warehouse operators) employed by 
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LSPs in relation to performance measurement and management, and their perceptions about 
their extent of control and influence over the client’s supply chain performance.  
The paper is based on three in-depth case studies of LSPs providing services specifically 
to their clients in Sweden and, as such, it present limitations in terms of external validity of 
its findings. The identified antecedents and effects of performance attribution challenges need 
to be tested through a large-scale survey covering a wider range of service providers, 
operating in diverse industries and across countries, and also in other, less advanced service 
settings (e.g. provision of basic services such as transportation).  
Further research could also follow up the insights this study provided in relation to the 
inclusion of attribution-related indices into service level agreements and KPI matrices agreed 
between LSPs and their clients. Modelling studies could be particularly useful in this respect. 
They could potentially focus on the optimal design of attribution-related indices (considering 
also performance administration costs in relation to the ensuing benefits for LSPs) and their 
impact on gain and risk sharing between LSPs and their clients, as well as on logistics 
outsourcing performance more broadly. This study has provided empirical insights, but 
further work is required to develop a refined theoretical understanding of performance 
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Appendix A: The interview guide 
 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION  
• Organization information (industry, core business, products/services, annual turnover and market share, key 
customers/suppliers) 
• What is your position/role in relation to the company’s organizational structure? 
• What does your job entail? 
 
THE SUPPLY CHAIN 
• What is the structure/mapping of the customer’s supply chain? 
• What is the key material and information flows in the customer’s supply chain? 
• What is the scope of the provided logistics service(s)?  
• Can you briefly describe the services provided within the customer’s supply chain?  




• Can you briefly provide an overview of customer/LSP relationship in focus?  
• Can you provide a brief account of the customer/LSP relationship history and evolution over time (if 
applicable)? 
• What are the main challenges you face regarding the management of the customer/LSP relationship? (e.g. 
critical events) 
• How LSP-sub-contractor relations are managed and what are the key challenges in managing them?  
 
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT AND MANAGEMENT 
• How is the service specified in the contract (service specifications)? 
• How is ‘customer value’ defined and measured, if at all?  
• How is performance defined in the LSP-customer contract in terms of KPIs and service level targets?  
• Are there any extra-contractual performance measures (e.g. operational KPIs)? 
• How service performance and KPIs are measured and managed? 
• What kinds of performance measurement and management systems are being used?    
• How is service performance reported?  
 
PERFORMANCE ATTRIBUTION   
• How service performance (KPI results) can be attributed to specific actions? To what extent? 
• What do you perceive as key challenges regarding performance attribution? Any examples? 
• What are the key causes of such attribution challenges, if any? 
• How does service co-production influence performance measurement and management? 
• How difficult/easy is to clearly separate and agree the required service inputs of each party involved in 
service delivery? 
• What are the effects of attribution challenges on the LSP-customer relationship? 
• What is the organization’s attitude towards performance-related risks? What factors influence this attitude?  
• Are you prepared to accept an increased amount of risk in this specific customer/LSP contract? Under what 
conditions? 
• How are these effects managed within the LSP-customer relationship? 
• How can the performance measurement system in place take into account attribution issues? 
• What is the design of the payment mechanism included in the customer/LSP contract and why? 
• How is financial risk allocated and managed in this contract?  
• What other clauses of the contract relate to performance and risk allocation/delimitation?  
• What is the role of collaboration and trust vis-à-vis the formal contract in managing attribution challenges 









Appendix B: The list of interviewed managers   
 




1. Global Key Account Manager 
2. Global Key Account Manager 
3. Manager Air & Outsourcing, Global Accounts 
4. Ocean Freight and Air Manager, Operations 
5. Manager Air & Outsourcing, Global Accounts 
 
 
6. Global Supply Manager and 







1. Managing Director 
2. Operations Director 
3. BD Manager, Business Control & Development 
4. BD Manager, Business Control & Development 
5. Business Developer, Business Control & Development 
6. BD Manager, Business Control & Development  
7. Business Developer, Business Control & Development 
8. Business Developer, Business Control & Development 
9. BD Manager, Business Control & Development 
10. BD Manager, Business Control & Development 
11. Logistics Network Manager, Distribution Network 
12. BD Manager & Logistics Network Manager 
13. BD Manager & Business Developer 
14. Logistics Network Manager, Distribution Network 




16. General Manager, Service sub-




1. Vice President, Global BD 
2. BD General Manager, Inbound transport 
3. BD General Manager, Outbound transport 
4. BD General Manager, Packaging  
5. Key Account Manager 1, BD 
6. Key Account Manager 2 , BD 
7. Key Account Manager 3, BD 
8. Internal Control Manager, BD 
9. Operations Manager, Distribution Planning & Control 
10. Operations Manager & Traffic Coordinator, 
Operations  
11. Legal Counsel, Legal  
12. Insurance Purchaser & Damage Prevention & Claims 
Handling Manager, Risk Management  
13. Financial & Control Manager, Finance 
14. Vice President, Purchasing 
15. Internal Control Manager, BD 
 
 
16. Managing Director, Service 














Figure 1. Antecedents and effects of performance attribution challenges in outsourced service 




















 Case A Case B Case C 
LSP firm Logistics provider 
specialising in freight 
forwarding and air and 
ocean freight transport 
  
Fourth-party logistics 
provider specialising in the 
food retail market 
Logistics provider 
specialising mainly in the 
automotive industry 
Market expertise  Industrial, FMCG, fashion, 
retail 




No of employees  30,000 80 1,200 
Turnover  €6,800 million 
 
€90 million €1,069 million  
Client firm Manufacturer of packaging 
solutions and industrial 
packaging production 
machines  
International food retailer 
operating also a chain of 
in-store restaurants. 
Manufacturer of cars and 
auto engines  
Industry  Packaging  Food retail  Automotive 
No of employees 23,540 30,000 21,500 
Turnover  €11,075 million 
 
€1,400 million €13,200 million 
Services provided by LSP 
to client firm  
Logistics Control Tower 
solution: Freight 
forwarding, shipment 
booking & coordination, 
customs clearance, invoice 
administration and cost 
control, carrier tendering & 
performance monitoring. 
SCM solution: Supply & 
demand management, 
product purchasing,  ERP 
solution, business 




ownership & management. 
Logistics and freight 
management solution: 
Inbound & outbound 
transportation 
management, returnable 
packaging services, freight 
insurance services, quality 
control & maintenance 
services, and logistics 
consulting.  
 
Table 1. Background information about the case study companies  
 




Deliveries accuracy % 
 
Accuracy of sailing list when 
using multiple carriers % 
 
CO2 emissions reduction % 
 
End customer satisfaction survey 
score (> specified threshold) 
 
Product availability % (at store 
and central warehouse) 
 
Transport delivery accuracy % 
 
Picking accuracy %;  
 
Product damages %;  
 
’Perfect orders’ (OTIF) %;  
 
Packaging availability %;  
 
Packaging delivery precision %;  
 
Transport delivery precision %;  
 
No of product damages 




metrics   
Total freight cost reduction %  
 
Ocean freight cost reduction % 
 
Logistics cost reduction related to 
provider innovation  % 
  
Supply chain cost reduction % 
(as compared to cost baseline in 
previous year) 
 
Annual logistics cost savings % in 
terms of efficient transport and 
returnable packaging solutions (as 




Unit-price for shipment 
administration (per shipment) plus 
incentive fee (bonus /malus 
payment) calcuated based on 
overall score (weighted KPIs). 
 
Gain share model for logistics cost 
reduction % as result of 
innovation (e.g. >20% savings 
leads to 50-50 split of savings) 
Fixed price plus incentive fee 
structure. Incentive fee (bonus) 
is linked to “product 
availability” and “supply chain 
cost reduction” targets as 
specified by client 
No performance-oriented 
incentives agreed.  
 
Cost-plus management fee for 
transport management services. 
 
Unit-price pricing for packaging 
services (per package unit) 
 








challenges   
 
Challening to clealry 
attribute to LSP effort the 
following KPI results: 1) 
On time ocean freight 
deliveries, 2) Freight cost 
reduction, 3)  CO2 
emissions reduction, and 4) 
Logistics cost reduction 








“We are always trying to improve but in some areas it was 
quite difficult to over-perform since there are a lot of 







LSP Global KAM 
 
Antecedents LSP input to CO2 emissions 
reduction tough to separate 
from others’ inputs due to 
interdependent decisions 
 
Required inputs from client 
and sub-contractors; effect 
of uncontrollable factors 















LSP limited capability in 




“The air freight shipments are mostly driven by 
commercial decisions, and it’s definitely in the opposite 
direction of what the KPIs try to achieve”. 
 
 
“The customer needs to place the bookings earlier, to plan 
this and that, to provide us with the packing lists and all the 
correct information […] they have problems to get the 
instructions from their customers, they are pushing them to 
get the information in good time so that we can plan the 
transports”. 
“The machines must be carried under deck and we have 
been discussing if we could find a way to avoid water 
damaging the machines and carry them on deck and save 
some time and cost […] they [the customer] are trying to 
change the product structure and this can have a big 
impact on cost and lead time…but for their production 
department is not that easy”.  
“The transport accuracy KPI is hard to hit because we are 
dependent on carriers’ performance…we could somehow 
affect that by changing the mix of modes but still at the end 
of the day we are at the hands of the carriers”. 
 
“Are we good enough at analyzing the data? I don’t think 
so. We have to see if all the data we are collecting are 

























LSP Global KAM 
 
Effects  Aversion to financial risk 
re: CO2 emissions and 
freight cost reduction and 





opportunism and unfair 
allocation of performance 
gains 
 
“We will make sure that air freight shipments driven by 
commercial decisions are excluded from the 
measurements...we should have done it last year! And we 
need to adjust the factor used to calculate CO2 emissions 
because it is based on old technologies [...] things have 
changed with slow steaming and new engine standards”. 
 
“I think we have the ideas. We know we are improving but 
we are not good at telling them what we do. But then we 
also have discussions and then they say we don’t have time 
now…and then suddenly they pick up the idea and use it”. 



















penalty not paid by LSP 
“There was a paradox; even though we got the savings we 
wanted and even higher, the overall score was still below 
the overall target. So we didn’t want to get the penalty 
since the savings were far higher than expected […] 
performance in this respect [carbon emissions] was 
affected by decisions of market companies [end customers] 















challenges   
 
Difficulties of attributing 
supply chain cost 
reduction results to LSP 
efforts and actions, as 





“The noise in this big supply chain is quite substantial, some 
[food] suppliers change range, some volumes go that 
way…so there is a lot of noise when you are trying to 
measure cost improvements…and this variation means that 
we won’t be able to measure the improvements as clear as 





Antecedents Warehouse and transport 
cost efficiency gains in 
shared-service settings 
difficult to separate 
 
Effect of client product 
volumes not easily 
separable from LSP input 
to supply chain cost 
efficiency 
 
Required input from 
client and its customers 








Sub-contractor input into 
cost efficiency contested 
 
 
Limited capability to 
measure and attribute 
client-specific savings 
“A 3PL provider has a lot of other clients, so how do you 
separate out our cost, the sub-contractors say. Because the 
idea of 3PL warehousing is sharing cost and sharing man-
hours; it’s really difficult”. 
 
“We have suggested that we want a model based on volume 
but without given the benefits for things that could be done 
without our support. Because volumes can go up with 
building new stores which has nothing to do with our cost 
efficiency performance”. 
 
“We will need their [customer] support, absolutely, because 
we can’t impact much without their changes […] if we don’t 
change the ways the stores order or reduce frequencies of 
deliveries […] there cannot be the savings they are looking 
for without a change of methodology, a change of thinking”. 
 
“The value-add index connects to the core service, because 
we cannot forecast the complexity of operations based on 
number of deliveries, number of markets, and so on”. 
 
“They [LSP] are the supply chain managers…they are 
telling us what to do […] we don’t have the big picture, they 
own it, and they have to take responsibility for all this”.  
 
“…you don’t have the unit cost for picking a carton for that 
customer; usually use the average of picking for everyone. 
So it would be hard for them [sub-contractors] to provide 






























Effects  LSP aversion to excessive 




LSP fears of potential 




“I think we will end up with a bonus system that is weak in 
terms of driving incentives […] it is very hard to reach these 
[cost saving] targets […] if they are not achievable, the 
bonus will be something that we will not budget for”.  
 
“…there won’t be any follow up in terms of who is 
responsible for savings, who should be doing what to 
achieve those and this kind of “ping-pong” dialogue of who 
is to blame […] this can damage the relationship” 
 









LSP emphasis on fixed 




Collaboration, trust and 
win-win mentality in 
focus 
“I think from our point of view is important that we have a 
large fixed element to lean back on and say that we have 
secured the health of the business. It’s not a profitable 
business unless we are successful with the bonus, but at least 
it is a healthy business if we only get the fixed fee”. 
 
“I mean it [the bonus for cost reduction] should be based on 
transparency and trust...this is what we want to have as a 
margin, at least as basis, and then let’s test this model and 


















challenges   
 
Challenging to attribute to 
LSP effort, as opposed to 
effort of other parties, the 
following performance 
results: 1) logistics cost 
savings, and 2) packaging 
availability, and 3) 
packaging delivery precision 
 
 
“…we sometimes have discussions with customers what is 
theirs and our contribution. Logistics of course is relative 
to the actions[...] So we do have some interesting 
discussions with customers and some of them they are 
trying to hold us responsible for the logistics performance 
overall, regardless if it’s due to structural changes, change 





Antecedents Difficult to separate LSP 
inputs into cost efficiency 





Required client input e.g. in 
terms of timely information 







Required input from the 
client’s suppliers in terms of 




Limited LSP capability in 
data collection and analysis  
 
“They [the customer] want more of an open-book 
relationship with high transparency. But if you have a 
group of people working with all customers, then it is 
difficult to break down this cost and state specifically how 
much it costs to work with them as opposed to other 
customers…plus this can change over time also”. 
 
“We buy yearly volume [from carriers], we have 10,000 
cars…can you take them over the year? But if you get 
10,000 cars in December, they won’t cope with it […] all of 
a sudden they [carriers] say we have a problem”.  
 
“They [customer] don’t commit to these volumes […] and 
that also affects the carrier side”.  
 
 
“When the package is used by these suppliers to serve the 
customer, then this becomes also part of the inbound flow 
to customer plants [...] if they [customer’s suppliers] have 
too much packaging, then we ask them to pay a rent for 
packaging or if they have too little, then we charge them for 
missing packaging”. 
 
“[. . .] we do it manually today so we have to have a 
system, to get everything into the system [. . .] and we need 
to make sure that the input data are correct, so that you 




























Effects  LSP aversion to financial 
risk related to ‘pay for 
performance’ incentives 
 
Client perception of lack of 
costing and pricing 
transparency  
 
“Currently we are risk averse. We are trying to change that 
but over the last ten years we have become more and more 
risk averse for some reason”. 
 
“[The main challenge is] to offer them [customer] 
transparency. Because they want an open-book philosophy 
and we haven’t been good at offering that. So there are 
issues around trust and whether the prices we quote them 
are the correct ones, [customer] people wonder”. 
 
“[…] we need to revitalize the business relationship 
















Delimiting LSP risk and 
liabilities related to 
performance through 
contracting  
“We don’t accept penalties [...] well…you can turn it the 
other way around and perhaps say if we perform our 
services and reach our goals, then we can receive extra 
money. But I am not so happy about that either. You should 
always do your best. So then why should you receive extra 





































LSP input into CO2 emissions 
reduction performance difficult to 
separate from decisions and actions 
of the client and its customers (e.g. 
order pattern, production lead 
times) as well as sub-contractor 
capacity planning decisions 
 
 
Required client inputs in cost 
reduction and innovation outcomes 
e.g. product design changes; 
required shipping lines’ input in 
timely deliveries;discussions about 
the effect of uncontrollable inputs 
(e.g. freight market rates) on cost 
reduction and how to account for 
them. 
 
LSP lack of capabilities in 
performance data analysis; no 
systematic documention of 
innovative ideas and their 
implementation 
   
 
 
Scale economies and cost 
synergies arising from LSP 
and sub-contractors serving 
multiple clients; difficult to 
separate cost efficiency 
gains/losses from changes in 
client’s and its customers’ 
(stores) product volumes  
 
Cost reduction requires 
convincing stores to accept 
reduced service levels; 
dicussion about who should 
manage uncontrollable factors 
at play e.g. regulatory 
changes; sub-contractor input 
to cost efficiency contested 
 
 
Measurement system not 
capable to attribute LSP and 
sub-contractor cost savings to 
customer-specific operations  
 
 
Cost synergies arising from 
LSP and sub-contractors 
serving multiple clients; 
difficult to separate LSP inputs 
in cost efficiency from those of 




Client required to provide 
timely information of volume 
forecasts; client and its 
suppliers’ role in packaging 
availability; client’s (lack of) 
commitment to product 
volumes impacts on LSP and 
sub-contractor efficiency  
  
 
Lack of capable systems to 
collect and analyse performance 















LSP aversion to performance risk 





LSP perceptions of client 
opportunism in relation to 
innovation ideas implementation 
and perceived unfairness of 





LSP aversion to risk related to 
the supply chain cost 
reduction KPI; request for 
appropriate intensity of cost 
reduction-based bonus 
 
Potential detrimental effects 
of performance attribution to 
client relationship due to 
encouragement of a  ‘finger-
pointing’ culture   
 
 
LSP refusal to link service fee 
to logistics cost savings and 




Client’s perceived lack of 
transparency of service costs 
and pricing  
 
 
















Penalty/bonus only small % of total 
service fee; contract re-design in 





‘accountability’ indeces connected 
to KPI measurement; three-way 
performance review meetings 
 
 
Stipulated financial penalty was not 
paid by provider to maintain 
collaboration and re-institute 




Provider emphasis on 
securing a reasonable fixed 
fee; Cost reduction bonus of 




analysis and identification of 
corrective actions without 
attribution indices  
 
 
Emphasis on ‘team effort’, 
collaboration, trust, flexibility 





Provider payment not tied to 
KPIs; adherence to unit-price 
and cost-plus mechanisms. 
Delimited provider liability for 
non-performance excluding also 






Table 6. Antecedents and effects of performance attribution challenges across the cases 
